|
The start of the period 1994 to 2002 of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in northern Uganda saw the conflict intensifying due to Sudanese support to the rebels. There was a peak of bloodshed in the mid-1990s and then a gradual subsiding of the conflict. Violence was renewed beginning with the offensive by the Uganda People's Defence Force in 2002. For a seven-year period beginning in 1987, the Lord's Resistance Army was a minor rebel group along the periphery of Uganda. However, two weeks after Museveni delivered his ultimatum of 6 February 1994, LRA fighters were reported to have crossed the northern border and established bases in southern Sudan with the approval of the Khartoum government.〔O’Kadameri, Billie. ("LRA / Government negotiations 1993-94" ) in Okello Lucima, ed., (''Accord magazine: Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda'' ), 2002.〕 The end of the Bigombe peace initiatives marks a fundamental shift in the character of the Lord's Resistance Army, which is estimated to have consisted of 3,000 to 4,000 combatants at this time.〔Gersony, Robert. (The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Results of a Field-based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda ) (PDF), US Embassy Kampala, March 1997, p. 40〕 This is the turning point at which the LRA becomes essentially the organization that operates today. ==Sudanese support expands the scale of the conflict== Sudanese aid was a response to Ugandan support for the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) fighting in the civil war in the south of the country. Prior to this support, the LRA could be treated as a minor irritant in the outskirts of the country; now it also had to be considered a proxy force of the Khartoum government. Sudanese support allowed the LRA to increase the intensity of its operations beyond the level at which it was previously capable.〔Ogenga Otunnu, ("Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland" ), in Okello, 2002.〕 Not only was a safe haven granted from which the LRA could launch attacks into Uganda, but Sudan also gave a large amount of arms, ammunition, land mines and other supplies.〔 In return, the LRA was expected to deny territory to the SPLA and periodically participate in joint operations with the Sudanese army.〔(Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda ) (PDF), (Refugee Law Project ) of Makerere University, Uganda, February 2004, p. 18.〕 The increased intensity of attacks through proxy forces led Uganda and Sudan to the brink of open hostilities in 1995.〔Ofcansky, T. "Warfare and Instability Along the Sudan-Uganda Border: A Look at the Twentieth Century" in Spaulding, J. and S. Beswick, eds. ''White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala''. Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, NJ: 2000, pp. 196-200〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1994–2002)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|